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Daredevil and the Death Penalty 
 
 
Andrew E. Taslitz* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 What can the recent movie, Daredevil: The Man Without Fear, teach us about 
the death penalty?1  Daredevil the movie is based on the well-known Marvel comic 
series.  For the comic-book-challenged among you, I begin with a synopsis of this 
marvelous story, which takes Daredevil from a vigilante determined to cleanse evil 
from the face of the Earth (or at least from New York City) to a man unwilling to 
kill even the most murderous of thugs. 
 But what exactly is a “vigilante”?  A whirlwind review of the history of 
vigilante violence in America reveals that vigilantism, properly understood, 
involves the use of violence on behalf of the local community when it perceives 
itself no longer to be adequately protected by the state.  Vigilantism is thus 
generally extra-legal. 
 Yet why do Americans, who otherwise fear the abuse of government power, 
embrace the state’s ultimate power of imposing the death penalty?  Relying 
primarily on recent social science literature showing that the actual imposition of 
the death penalty is highest in states who applaud vigilante values, I conclude that 
American juries have strangely come to see their role as vigilante-like—protecting 
the community from outsiders who assail it in the face of an ineffectual state—
rather than as the imposition of state violence.  A richer understanding of the 
meaning of the Daredevil vigilante story shows why the subtle message of movies 
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Pennsylvania Law School.  Professor Taslitz is Co-Reporter for the Constitution Project’s Death 
Penalty Initiative and a member of the American Bar Association’s Ad Hoc Committee on Innocence 
and Ensuring the Integrity of the Criminal Justice System.  He is also a life-long fan of the art form 
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1  The summary here of Daredevil’s tale is drawn largely from my memory and interpretation 
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& MARK STEPHEN JOHNSON, DAREDEVIL (2003).  Because this essay is but a glorified film review, I 
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OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW                  [Vol 1:699 
 
 
700
like Daredevil can perhaps be an effective part of a strategy for bringing about the 
death penalty’s own demise.2 
 
II. THE MAN WITHOUT FEAR 
 
A. How the Blind Can See 
 
 Matt Murdock, a redheaded kid growing up in the notorious slum of Hell’s 
Kitchen, is the son of Jack Murdock, an ex-prizefighter known as “The Devil.”  
Though vehemently denying it when confronted by his son, Jack is an enforcer 
collecting debts for a local mob boss rather than the warehouse-worker that he now 
claims to be.  When Matt one day comes by the warehouse unannounced, he 
catches his aging father brutally beating a deadbeat.  Matt flees on his bicycle, 
crashing into a container of radioactive waste that splashes his eyes. 
 Although Matt’s accident blinds him, it opens up his other perceptions in 
startling ways.  All Matt’s other senses are dramatically enhanced.  For example, 
he can hear conversations in apartments blocks away and feel the letters in 
ordinary newsprint.  Moreover, Matt has developed a new sense—a radar sense—
using high-pitched sounds to “see” what surrounds him.  Matt’s overall heightened 
awareness of his body makes him swift, agile, and somehow enormously strong.  
Matt is also a human lie-detector who can tell by the sound of a person’s heartbeat 
and the scent of his sweat whether that person speaks truly or falsely.   
 Jack, overcome with grief at what happened to his son, decides to go straight 
and return to boxing.  Jack “The Devil” wins fight after fight, snubbing the mob in 
the process, and becoming for Matt a symbol of redemption and of the little man’s 
power against evil. 
 But one day, Jack learns that his wins were engineered by the mob after all.  
When he refuses to throw a fight, Jack is murdered by a mysterious goon, Wilson 
Fisk, who later rises to become the “Kingpin of Crime” in New York City.  Neither 
Fisk nor his superiors are ever brought to justice.  The police did not help Matt’s 
dad, so Matt vows to cleanse the city of the mob.  
 
B. Justice Is Blind 
 
 Flash forward, ten to fifteen years later.  Matt is now a criminal defense 
lawyer, but a financially strapped one, for Matt represents only the near-poor, and, 
of them, only the innocent.  Because of his extraordinary powers, Matt unerringly 
knows who is guilty and who is not.  By day, he battles for right in the criminal 
justice system.  But that system too often still fails, as it did when he was a kid.  
The guilty sometimes walk. 
 So by night Matt becomes “Daredevil, The Man Without Fear”—a red-leather-
jumpsuit-wearing, masked avenger.  Two small horns protrude from his red mask, 
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and he carries a “billy-club,” two distinctive red sticks joined by an extendable 
rope, the sticks serving as nunchucks, the rope as a lifeline as he speeds across 
Manhattan rooftops.  Where the state fails to bring justice because of corruption, 
politics, turf battles, or incompetence, Daredevil brings righteous retribution.  But 
his retribution is mostly local.  He is primarily the defender of Hell’s Kitchen.  He 
speaks in its name. 
 And he speaks with fists, with clubs, with pain.  He is brutal, bringing blood, 
broken limbs, mutilation, even death, to the evil hordes who oppose him.  The 
state, of course, brands him a criminal, for it can sanction no competition over its 
own power to decide what uses of violence are legitimate.  But Daredevil resists 
the state, for it has lost its right to allegiance.  Daredevil serves the people, the 
community of Hell’s Kitchen, and it is only to that community that he will be 
answerable.  He does what is impossible because he knows no fear.  And we love 
him for it. 
 
C. Skepticism, Pain, and Redemption 
 
 Several events, however, shake Daredevil’s confidence in his mission.  First, 
while he is pummeling a drunken father who had viciously beaten his young 
daughter, the daughter screams in terror.  She begs Daredevil to stop.  Matt is 
genuinely surprised at her entreaties.  He thinks her dad is getting only what he 
deserves.  He responds, “Don’t be afraid.  I’m one of the good guys.”  The 
daughter is unimpressed.  Daredevil, troubled, leaves, pondering whether he may 
unknowingly have crossed over the line separating good from evil. 
 Second, Daredevil (as Matt Murdock) falls in love with a woman named 
Elektra, the wealthy heir of a father tainted by companionship with the Kingpin.  
Elektra shares, to Matt’s delight, his love and talent for violence.  Matt has resisted 
love up until now, for love means having something life-giving to lose.  Love 
brings fear.  Matt indeed comes to know fear when, in his Daredevil persona, he 
fights a super-villain named Bullseye whom the Kingpin has sent to kill Elektra.  
Matt loses the first part of that fight and suffers serious injuries.  Matt’s fear still 
lives, but now it is mingled with rage, grim determination, and soul-emptying 
heartache.  He battles further, “accidentally” hospitalizing Bullseye, who falls 
several stories to the street during the fight.  The audience is at this point uncertain 
whether that fall was actually Matt’s intended goal and whether Bullseye’s 
survival is, therefore, a grave disappointment for Matt. 
 Daredevil should himself be hospitalized at this point in the story.  Instead, he 
drags his battered body to fight the man-mountain that is the Kingpin.  In that 
process, the Kingpin unmasks Daredevil, recognizing him as Matt Murdock, the 
young lawyer who refused at an earlier time to work for someone of Wilson Fisk’s 
sordid reputation.  The Kingpin is close to winning what may turn out to be 
Daredevil’s final fight.  But Daredevil, reaching inside to find hidden strength, 
smashes a nearby water pipe that spews a rush of water which momentarily stuns 
the Kingpin.  Each drop of water makes a distinct sound as it sprays the Kingpin, 
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW                  [Vol 1:699 
 
 
702
greatly sharpening Daredevil’s radar “vision” of his opponent.  Daredevil fights 
with a new and awe-inspiring passion.  The Kingpin is near death.  A single further 
blow will kill him.  The Kingpin threatens to reveal Daredevil’s secret identity to 
the world, but Matt scoffs that no one will believe a story about a blind vigilante.  
The Kingpin acknowledges this, but he swears to bring Daredevil a slow, painful 
demise when the prison doors open, as they eventually will, to unleash the Kingpin 
once again on the city.   
 Still Daredevil will not kill.  When the Kingpin asks why, the unmasked, 
jump-suited hero replies, “Because I’m one of the good guys.”  Daredevil has re-
learned fear, remorse, and humility.  With their return, he retains more of Matt 
Murdock—the man who works for justice under the wing of the state—than 
before.  The death sentence is not a punishment that Matt has the right to impose, 
and perhaps, we are left to wonder, no one does.  The audience is ambivalent.  
Matt has endangered his life, his career, and his nightly mission by not killing the 
Kingpin when he had the chance.  That is true bravery; for Matt feels, but 
overcomes, the fear of doing what he thinks is right.  Many in the grumbling 
audience think, nevertheless, that Matt was foolish.  The Kingpin is wealthy and 
powerful, and he will beat the rap or be given an insufficient sentence.  That 
frightening, heartless blob, a smirking sphere of muscle and corruption, will haunt 
the world once again.  For some in the audience, Daredevil has failed.  This is not 
what vigilantes are supposed to do. 
 
III. WHAT ARE VIGILANTES SUPPOSED TO DO? 
 
A. Murder by Community: Vigilantism and Lynching Defined 
 
 The Daredevil character fits a long line of movie figures dubbed “vigilantes” 
by the media.  The most famous such figure for my generation was the character 
played by Charles Bronson in the movie Death Wish, about a man seeking 
vengeance in New York City’s subways by killing robbers after one killed his 
wife.3  But are Charles Bronson’s character and Matt Murdock really “vigilantes”?  
Understanding what vigilantes do and how Americans feel about them versus how 
we feel about the state’s use of violence more generally sheds light on the 
audience’s ambivalence about Daredevil’s decision to spare Kingpin’s life.  
Whether we see that act as heroic or foolish in turn helps us to better understand 
America’s love affair with the death penalty. 
 Mob violence and vigilantism share a common trait: the use of violence to 
impose social control or to achieve popular justice.4  These forms of violence 
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involve an appeal to shared notions of higher law when the law enacted by the 
state is seen as morally wrong, inadequate to the task, or nonexistent.  Mobs are 
social groups having no decisionmaking structure who come together for political 
or economic reasons.  They often form spontaneously, generally last only a brief 
time, and are united by a sense of shared interests and purposes.  Vigilantism 
differs from mob violence in the degree to which it is an organized movement 
whose members take the law into their own hands.  The late eighteenth century 
Stamp Act Riots, the Boston Tea Party, and Reconstruction lynch mobs are usually 
classified as mob actions, while the western committees organized to combat 
frontier violence and protect property—the thousands-strong San Francisco 
Vigilance Committee of 1865 being the most prominent example—are classified as 
the prototypical vigilante actions.   
 Nevertheless, the line between the two forms of violence can be hard to draw, 
and, for my purposes, such sharp distinctions are largely irrelevant.  Thus one 
leading social scientist bucks the scholarly trend by defining lynchings—a 
particularly important American form of extra-legal violence—as vigilante justice, 
and a leading historian defines lynching as “murder endorsed by community.”5  
This definition clarifies important qualities shared, albeit perhaps to varying 
degrees, by these different types of violence. 
 
B. Vigilante Violence as Popular Sovereignty 
 
 Vigilante violence and lynching in particular are rooted in an ideology of 
popular sovereignty: the people or communities are the real sovereigns; whenever 
those to whom they have delegated authority fail, it is the people’s right to take 
back that authority into their own hands.  This ideology is generally not anti-state, 
for “vigilantism commonly thrives on the idea that the state’s legitimacy at any 
point in time depends on its ability to provide citizens with the levels of law and 
order they demand.”6  Vigilantism is thus “often a vote of no confidence in state 
efficiency rather than in the concept of the state itself.”7  Vigilantes thus separate 
the state from the community, the former’s job being to protect the latter.  The 
problem is in defining who belongs to the “community” and who speaks for it. 
 For most vigilantes, the “community” is a local one.  Even in the locality, 
however, there are always some despised “others” outside the community.  Indeed, 
the very justification offered for vigilante action is often the government’s failure 
to protect the community from those who are in its midst, but are not truly of it—
those who would drain its life.  Thus, in nineteenth century San Francisco, many 
                                                                                                                            
5  See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 89–118 (criminologist defining lynchings as but one 
manifestation of “vigilante values”); WALDREP, supra note 1, at 7 (historian’s definition of 
“lynching”). 
 6  ABRAHAMS, supra note 1, at 4. 
7  Id. 
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residents believed that “vagabonds and thieves controlled the elections.”8  
Vigilante action was needed to wrest control from and punish these “very bad 
men.”9  In response to challenges to the legality of violence not sanctioned by 
formal law, orator William Durr told cheering San Franciscans that “while 
Americans owe their Constitution reverence and obedience, ‘the right to 
revolutionize is reserved to us.’”10  Durr insisted that the people retained “the 
privilege of so regulating our local affairs that our lives and property will be made 
safe through the correct administration of the law under the Constitution.”11   
 Similarly, in the Bleeding Kansas of the mid-1850s, free-soilers and proslavery 
forces battled each other over who was the community.  Until that question was 
settled, there could be no viable, legitimate government.  Each side took the 
position, of course, that the other side was not really of, and thus did not speak for, 
the true community.12  Violence was therefore justified; abolitionist John Brown 
expressed glee at the murders he and his son committed in justice’s name,13 while 
proslavers declared that “until we make laws, we are HIGHER-law men.  We go in 
for hanging thieves of all kinds.”14   
 Perhaps most resonant with modern concerns was the rise of the Ku Klux Klan 
during Reconstruction.  Republicans agreed that the People should rule, but 
defined “the People” as national in scope and including the newly-freed slaves.  
The Klan, however, defined the community narrowly as the local white, 
Democratic community, one free from carpetbaggers and scalawags.15 As historian 
Christopher Waldrep explains when discussing the situation in Kansas, “Lynchers 
always claimed to represent the People and crafted rhetoric to advance their 
claims.”16   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  WALDREP, supra note 1, at 57. 
11  Id. (emphasis added).  
12  ABRAHAMS, supra note 1, at 62–63.  For a more detailed summary of the context in which 
pro- and anti-slavery forces battled in the antebellum Kansas of the mid-1850s, see Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283 
(2000). 
13  See LOUIS A. DECARO, JR., “FIRE FROM THE MIDST OF YOU”: A RELIGIOUS LIFE OF JOHN 
BROWN, JR. 216–36 (2002) (tracing John Brown’s deeds and thoughts over the struggle in Bleeding 
Kansas and historians’ disputes over what were Brown’s true actions and responsibility); MERRILL D. 
PETERSON, JOHN BROWN: THE LEGEND REVISITED 5–6 (2003) (“[A]t a place on Pottawatomie Creek, 
[Brown] presided over the murder of five slave-state settlers.”). 
14  WALDREP, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting Atchison (Kansas) Squatter Sovereign, Mar. 13, 
1855). 
15  See id. at 67–84. 
16  Id. at 63 (discussing Kansas lynchers). 
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C. Co-opting the Frontier 
 
 Vigilante action often takes place on the frontiers of the state.  But these spatial 
frontiers are not limited to the old West or the early South; they extend to any 
geographic area outside the direct or full control of the state.  In modern times, 
certain inner city neighborhoods fit that description.  The failure of the state to 
protect its citizens equally may lead frontiersmen and women, old or new, to trust 
their local values over those of the broader society, as represented by agents of the 
state.  When those agents attempt to reassert state control—for example, by 
suddenly introducing especially aggressive policing—the agents may be resisted, 
perceived as passive or active friends of “the enemy.”17 
 Vigilante action can be a kind of rebellion by the weak against the strong, a 
further oppression by the strong against the weak, or one sort masked as the other.  
But it is the romantic image of vigilantes protecting the most vulnerable among us 
that accounts for the continuing appeal of vigilantism in the modern imagination.  
The state, however, cannot long tolerate any form of vigilantism before jealousy of 
lost power sets in.  Yet the sometimes powerful, popular appeal of vigilantism 
means that the state does better in its competition with the horde by co-opting it 
rather than destroying it.  As one commentator explains: 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, white authorities 
complicated the meaning of lynching, working to drive lynching 
indoors by making the criminal justice system more efficient, 
capable of delivering punishment so swiftly that no “lynching” 
need occur.  One governor proposed placing judges on call, to be 
summoned immediately to crime scenes for faster trials and 
quicker executions.  The states made rape a capital crime, giving 
juries the power to put rape defendants to death.  In other words, 
all-white, all-male juries got to pick which rapists lived and 
which ones died.  This was supposed to forestall “lynching” by 
substituting the power of the state for the mob.  It blurred the line 
between lynching and execution.18  
 
This tension between due process and what we might call “state vigilantism”—the 
bringing of private vigilantism into the public house, the co-opting of popular 
rage—turns out to be helpful in explaining both our love affair with the death 
penalty and our moral evaluation of Daredevil’s sparing of the Kingpin’s life. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
17  ABRAHAMS, supra note 1, at 25. 
18  WALDREP, supra note 1, at 152. 
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IV. STATE VIGILANTISM 
 
 The American embrace of the death penalty seems hard to square with 
Americans’ historical distrust of government power.19  The American Revolution 
was itself largely about limiting such power, and a strong, modern, probably 
dominant, strand of American political thinking derides the “welfare state” and 
“big government power.”  The structure of the Constitution, with its emphasis on 
federalism, the separation of powers, and a strong Bill of Rights highly protective 
of individual liberty, is designed to check government power.  Americans seem to 
fear government more than most, perhaps all, other industrialized nations.  Yet 
Americans overwhelmingly support the death penalty at a time when European 
nations and most of the industrialized world condemn the death penalty as a 
barbaric leftover from a less-civilized past, a blatant violation of human rights.20  
What explains this American exceptionalism? 
 
A. Vigilante Values 
 
 Criminologist Franklin Zimring suggests in a recent book that a plausible 
explanation for this puzzle is a fairly simple one: Americans have stronger 
indicators of a continuing zeal for vigilante values than do Europeans, and 
Americans understand the imposition of the death penalty to be more about 
vigilantism than state power.  Indeed, where vigilante values are highest in the 
United States, so are executions. 
 For example, in the years after Gregg v. Georgia’s21 imposition of certain 
procedural safeguards as a prerequisite to cranking up the death machine, more 
than “four out of five executions took place in the capital punishment confederacy, 
which means that the ratio of Southern to non-Southern executions has been four 
to one.”22  The states of the Old Confederacy accounted for the vast majority of 
lynchings in the twentieth century, while there was no such vigilante system at 
                                                                                                                            
19  On American fear of government power and belief in limited government, as well as contrary 
impulses in American history, see MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: 
ORIGINS OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2003); GARRY WILLS, 
A NECESSARY EVIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT (1999). 
20  See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 16–41 (comparing American and European attitudes toward the 
death penalty). 
21  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 153 (1976). 
22  ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 77.  Other writers have noted the connection between “Southern” 
values and the death penalty.  See, e.g., WALDREP, supra note 1, at 6–11 (suggesting that the 
American embrace of extra-legal violence has been especially strong in the South and linking that 
embrace to modern attitudes toward the death penalty).  However, I focus primarily on Zimring’s 
work because he has produced the most thorough and persuasive social science establishing this 
connection and fused it with historical and comparative analyses in a single book in a way that no 
other author has accomplished.  In a real sense, this essay is also a review of Zimring’s book, or 
perhaps more of a song of praise, a duet sung by the law professor (me) and the superhero 
(Daredevil) to the criminologist (Zimring). 
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work in the American Northeast.23  Half of the states with the lowest lynching rates 
have no modern death penalty,24 and all but two of the states with the lowest 
lynching rates are at the “bottom end of the distribution of modern executions,” 
while “[t]hose states that had the most extensive lynching histories in the past now 
execute without exception and collectively dominate the nation’s execution 
totals.”25  
 Zimring also examined modern indicators of “vigilante values,” values 
showing a distrust of government’s ability to do the right thing for the community, 
especially concerning protection from predators.  Thus, he examined individual 
survey data concerning whether respondents viewed the word “vigilante” 
favorably, and whether they believed that individual acts of shooting a criminal 
aggressor are sometimes justified.  The South stands out with the most positive 
responses to these questions; simply put, Southerners view vigilantes as good and 
individual assaults on criminals as wise.26  Likewise, Zimring suggested that in a 
high “vigilante values” state, there should be a greater percentage of killings in 
defense against criminals by citizens relative to such killings by police because the 
police represent the state.  Again, he found that “[t]he South is the only region 
where citizens account for a larger number of lethal incidents than police.”27  
 Zimring further found that those states executing the most offenders are also 
substantially less likely to have average or high tax rates than do states that have 
had few or no executions, a fact that likely reflects a greater distrust of 
government.28  Importantly, there are also strong indicators that distrust of local 
government, at least concerning the death penalty, is particularly strong in the 
states with the highest number of executions.29   
 Vigilante values are embraced to some degree, however, in all regions of the 
United States.  Those values are simply the strongest where the most executions 
take place.  Support for the death penalty in principle does not vary in relation to 
vigilante-worship, nor is Zimring arguing that death-penalty verdicts necessarily so 
vary.  Rather, his data suggests that actual executions are strongly correlated with 
the modern strength of vigilante values. 
                                                                                                                            
23  ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 92. 
24  See id. at 97. 
25  Id. at 96. 
26  See id. at 102–03. 
27  Id. at 107. 
28  See id. at 113–14. 
29  See id. at 112–13: 
To the extent that toleration of taxes is a good measure of trust in government, 
the states that execute the most are substantially less likely than average to trust 
the very levels of government that conduct executions.  What may bridge the 
gap between distrust of government and acceptance of execution is the feeling 
among the populace that executions are a community rather than government 
function. 
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B. Due Process Values 
 
 Zimring is not saying that fairness is irrelevant to Southerners.  To the 
contrary, all Americans embrace due process values as a way to restrain 
governmental abuses.  But the relative degree of a commitment to due process 
values versus a commitment to vigilante values accounts for differences in 
execution rates.  Americans are conflicted about the death penalty, and that conflict 
can be resolved in surprising ways.  The obsession with due process—what 
Zimring calls the “due process mindset”30—distrusts government not for its 
weakness, corruption, and wastefulness, but for its strength and efficiency.  The 
due process thinker fears governments exercising power arbitrarily, falsely 
accusing citizens, and punishing the innocent.  The Leviathan’s arrogance can lead 
it to make mistakes.31  Accordingly, the due process mindset deliberately looks for 
ways to slow or block the government’s use of violence.  Death being the ultimate 
and irreversible punishment, due process thinkers will exhaust every avenue, 
slowing or halting executions and raising their costs.  The expense to get it right is 
worth it because even a criminal defendant “is viewed as a member of the 
community and a citizen.”32   
 The vigilante attitude, by contrast, sees delay and expense in killing as a 
thorough waste of time: 
 
The vigilante mindset assumes that the offender can be identified 
without legal procedures, while the due process mindset assumes 
there is substantial difficulty in sorting out the guilty from the 
innocent.  Behind that contrast lies another: The criminal 
offender is an outsider in the vigilante imagination, not a genuine 
member of the community.  No wonder he is so easy to 
identify.33  
 
As readers should expect by now, Zimring finds due process protections, and thus 
substantial and costly delays, to be significantly higher in those states with the 
lowest rates of actual execution.  Of course, in all states defendants have ultimate 
recourse to the federal system.  But precisely because the federal system is the last 
step in the process, it is also the most visible step, and Southerners hold it and its 
allegedly nonsensical usurpation of local prerogative as the primary cause of 
expensive delays.34  
 
 
                                                                                                                            
30  Id. at 122. 
31  Id.  
32  Id.  
33  Id.  
34  See id. at 78–80. 
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C. Juror Vigilantes 
 
 This still leaves open the question of how Southerners can view the state’s 
killing a human being as more the community’s conduct than the government’s.  
One possible explanation, though not one limited to the South, is that the death 
sentence is one of the few times that the jury, rather than the judge, imposes 
sentence.  In the vast majority of states, juries decide guilt, but judges decide 
punishment, except where death is at issue.  (The primary exceptions, 
interestingly, are a few states in the South and its borders that still rely on jury 
sentencing in some non-capital cases.)  There is probably something very personal, 
as a juror, in being the one who decides that another shall die.  I say “the one” 
because each juror has this power; a single “no” vote saves a life (at least in most 
jurisdictions).  Furthermore, the jury is understood to be the community’s voice, so 
it feels like the community itself, rather than the state, is doing the killing. 
 But Zimring puts greater emphasis on the way that the modern death system 
seeks to personalize a death trial as a struggle between the offender and the 
victim’s family.35  This struggle is portrayed as one in which the community 
champions the cause of its most vulnerable, reaffirming the victim’s family’s status 
as valued community members.  In effect, “the penalty phase is remade into what 
sociologists call a ‘status competition’ between the offender (whose claims to 
sympathy and understanding are the subject of his penalty phase presentation) and 
those who were directly or derivatively injured by the crime.”36   
 Victims are, therefore, permitted, even encouraged, to attend the executions.  
Victim Impact Statements, based largely on interviews with the surviving family, 
are taken.37  These may emphasize that the victims were “butchered like animals,” 
describing survivors’ fear, sleeplessness, pain, and anger.  Even more powerful can 
be victim testimony at the penalty phase, described in this way by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in one leading case: 
 
The State presented the testimony of Charisse’s mother, Mary 
Zvolanek.  When asked how Nicholas [her grandchild] had been 
affected by the murders of his mother and sister, she responded: 
“He cries for his mom.  He doesn’t seem to understand why she 
                                                                                                                            
35  See id. at 54–55.  One author has recently made a strong case for having juries decide all 
criminal sentences precisely because it democratizes the criminal justice system.  See Jenia 
Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311 (2003).  Jury involvement in 
capital cases has, however, contributed to the expression of vigilante values; although the non-capital 
cases of which Iontcheva writes may arguably involve a different dynamic than the capital ones, the 
death juries’ experiences should give us pause.  Cf. id. at 314 & n.16 (Only six states—Arkansas, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia, primarily states high in vigilante values—
currently employ jury sentencing in non-capital cases.) 
36  See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 55. 
37  Id. at 53.  On the effect of such impact statements on juries and American culture, see Susan 
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (1996). 
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doesn’t come home.  And he cries for his sister Lacie.  He comes 
to me many times during the week and asks me, ‘Grandmama, 
do you miss my Lacie?’ And I tell him yes.  He says, ‘I’m 
worried about my Lacie.’”38   
 
In the face of such agonizing victim cries and of press and prosecutorial calls for 
“closure” for the family, it is hard to view the failure to impose the death sentence 
as anything but community expulsion of the survivors from the People’s ranks.  
Although this personalization happens in death trials throughout the United States, 
it makes it particularly easy for those already living in vigilante-values-embracing 
localities to accept the death sentence as the community’s choice and not that of 
the lumbering Behemoth we call the state.39   
 
V. CONCLUSION: GIVING THE DEVIL HIS DUE 
 
 Now we are in a position to understand the audience’s discomfort with 
Daredevil’s choice not to kill the Kingpin.  Daredevil is a true vigilante, not a 
Charles Bronson clone.  Although Daredevil acts alone—unlike the infamous 
vigilantes of American history—he does so on behalf of the local community.  He 
defends the state; indeed he is, as a lawyer, partly the state’s tool.  But he befriends 
only a state that does its job well.  When the state fails, he intervenes, and, like the 
vigilantes of old, he sees no need for a trial, for he can unerringly separate the 
guilty from the innocent.  He acts where the People cannot, and he speaks in their 
name.  Moreover, because the community that he defends is one of the powerless 
and the outcasts, we as the audience cheer him on. 
 Yet Daredevil, in his guise as lawyer Matt Murdock, also enthusiastically 
embraces due process values.  Of course, criminal defense lawyers play by the 
rules—that is, the laws—crafted by the state, serving as “officers of the court.”40  
But defense lawyers challenge the state too, acting as zealous adversaries who 
press the state to uphold its noblest ideals of fairness and who monitor its abuses.41  
Defense lawyers test the state’s evidence in a quest to raise skepticism about 
whether its belief that it has the right man is justified.  The Daredevil/Matt 
Murdock duality reflects the tension in the American character between vigilante 
values and due process values. 
 In the certainty that “he deserved it,” Daredevil beat an abusive father until 
The Man Without Fear recognized that he himself had frightened the child whom 
                                                                                                                            
38  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814–15 (1991) (citations omitted). 
39  See ZIMRING, supra note 1, at 58–63, 146, 176, 198 (on “closure”). 
40  See generally Andrew E. Taslitz & Sharon Styles-Anderson, Still Officers of the Court: Why 
the First Amendment Is No Bar To Challenging Racism, Sexism and Ethnic Bias in the Legal 
Profession, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781 (1996). 
41  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Criminal Law Practice, in OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 
187 (Kermit Hall ed., 2002). 
2004]                          DAREDEVIL AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
 
711
 
he sought to protect.  The little girl did not share Daredevil’s conviction that 
brutally beating her dad was a well-earned punishment.  From seeing her fear, 
Daredevil learned the wisdom of doubt, the grace of humility.42  Traditional Jewish 
law prohibits a jury from imposing a death sentence where the verdict is 
unanimous, for fear that where there is no doubt, there is no serious deliberative 
judgment.43  This same lesson was taught to Daredevil by a child’s terrified eyes.  
 Daredevil felt his own fear when his lady love, Elektra, suffered, then died.  
Elektra was no saint.  She was raised by a wealthy, corrupt man; she was taught to 
use violence when necessary; and she was quick to anger and vengeance.44  None 
of that justified her death.  Daredevil’s pain at her loss did not harden his heart, but 
softened it.  His fear of loss taught him empathy, and empathy makes it hard to 
enjoy another’s pain.45  This combination of humility and empathy stanched 
Daredevil’s bloodlust.  He could not kill the Kingpin, but only bring him to true 
justice, turning him over to the police for trial.  Due process values prevailed, as 
symbolized by the Kingpin ripping off Daredevil’s horned mask.  Unmasked, the 
superhero is no longer a devil, an angry vigilante, but the sober lawyer, Matt 
Murdock, committed to fairness even in the face of his own private horror. 
 This, then, is the source of the audience’s discomfort at Matt Murdock’s show 
of mercy toward the mountainous Kingpin: the whole point of the movie up until 
this moment has been to make us celebrate Murdock’s vigilante justice.  Yet just 
when he can deliver the coup de grace, he hesitates, pulls back, and then repents.  
Either he is a renegade who has ceased to speak for a merciless community—thus 
a violent brute, but no longer a vigilante—or he has rejected the absolute wisdom 
of vigilante values.  If the latter is true, then if we continue to identify with 
Daredevil, we too must reject the most extreme aspects of vigilantism.  Of course, 
Daredevil will continue to fight villains on our behalf, so he is a vigilante still.  But 
he no longer will take his vigilantism so far.  Neither should we.  The audience 
must thus choose to expel Daredevil as an unwanted outsider—something hard to 
do after two hours of sharing his struggle—or to embrace him as, in part, an 
                                                                                                                            
42  See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Inadequacies of Civil Society: Law’s Complementary Role in 
Regulating Harmful Speech, 1 MARGINS: MD. INTERDISC. PUB. ON RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & 
CLASS 305, 341 (2001) (discussing humility and retributivism). 
43  See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TURBULENT AGE 329 
(2002) (“I recall vividly a class in Talmud in which I learned that a Jewish Sanhedrin (religious court) 
that had imposed the death penalty by a unanimous vote could not carry out the sentence, since 
unanimity meant that the accused did not have a zealous advocate presenting his arguments within 
the tribunal.”). 
44  Elektra’s father had long been a perhaps reluctant partner, but a partner nevertheless, of the 
Kingpin of Crime.  The Kingpin killed the father when he asked that his interests with the Kingpin be 
bought out and their relationship severed.  Elektra’s father long knew of the dangerous world into 
which he brought his daughter, having trained her from young childhood in the martial arts. 
45  See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 47–57 (1998) (discussing the role of empathy in jury deliberations). 
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apostle of life.  Most audience members will choose life, but reluctantly, with 
discomfort and confusion. 
 Why, however, did I need to mention Daredevil at all?  Why not focus this 
essay solely on the history and current state of American vigilantism?  In part, as a 
comic-book lover, I think that Daredevil’s story told alone, apart from being placed 
in the context of “real-life” history and social science, can teach these same 
lessons, though reality helps to strengthen the argument.  More important is that 
historians and empiricists studying vigilantism will not ordinarily be in the public’s 
eye.  But many millions of Americans saw Daredevil in the movie theatres, and 
millions more will see it on DVD.  Daredevil reaches the souls of everyday 
Americans, and more movies with similar goals can grant us the humility we, as a 
society, should seek. 
 Or perhaps such movies reach only my soul, which is in many ways still that of 
a twelve-year-old child.  Most viewers, after all, will likely not share my passion 
for comic books as a serious form of art and will rush to see blockbuster special 
effects flicks primarily for the action, rather than to discern the films’ “deeper 
meaning.”  Nevertheless, I think it likely that many viewers will at least be touched 
by some subconscious understanding of the movie’s message.  As media 
criminologist Ray Surette has explained, “in large industrialized nations with 
hundreds of millions of people, cultural change without media involvement does 
not occur.  The media simultaneously change, react to, and reflect culture and 
society—in the process making available explanatory frameworks to perceive and 
understand issues like crime.”46  Indeed, a veritable cottage industry of academics 
has arisen exploring the ways in which media help to shape criminal justice 
politics and policies at both the conscious and subconscious levels.47 
 Superheroes play a particularly important role in American attitudes toward 
crime, drawing on and helping to mold an “American monomyth,” a fundamental 
set of interconnecting narratives embodying powerful American values.48  
Professors Robert Jewett and John Shelton Lawrence explain: 
 
                                                                                                                            
46  RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND REALITIES II (2d ed. 
1998). 
47  See generally ROBERT ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: 
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA (2000); ELAYNE RAPPING, LAW AND JUSTICE AS SEEN ON TV (2003); 
ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: HOW HATE SPEECH PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 63–64 
(1996). 
48  ROBERT JEWETT & JOHN LAWRENCE, CAPTAIN AMERICA AND THE CRUSADE AGAINST EVIL: 
THE DILEMMA OF ZEALOUS NATIONALISM 28–29 (2003) (defining the American superhero 
“monomyth”) [hereinafter JEWETT & LAWRENCE, CAPTAIN AMERICA]; ROBERT JEWETT & JOHN 
LAWRENCE, THE MYTH OF THE AMERICAN SUPERHERO (2002) (book-length treatment of this 
“monomyth”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 
5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 429–33 (1996) (defining “myth” and exploring its 
cognitive and cultural implications). 
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When we look at the pulp literature, films, television, and video 
games that receive the steady attention of most American minds, 
we must also recognize that they are thereby forming a cultural 
matrix for action.  The superhero tales amount to a kind of 
mythic induction into the cultural values of America.  A citizen’s 
brief interludes at church, synagogue, or mosque are far less 
likely to impart a significant vision of how to cope with the 
world’s conflicts.  But as the artistic creators of popular 
entertainment respond to current events with mythic scenarios, 
they help to shape the public sense of what is appropriate in 
confronting the crises of national and international life.49 
 
The American superhero monomyth, these authors further explain, “embodies the 
vigilante tradition, in which redeemer figures who often wore the white robes of 
the Book of Revelation rid the community of its ostensible enemies.”50 
 There are two modern strands of the American superhero monomyth.  One 
strand is represented by author Frank Miller’s re-visioning of the older Batman 
into The Dark Knight,51 an aging mass of still muscle-rippling vengeance, 
mercilessly torturing and killing the unrighteous who stand in his way.  Marvel 
comics’ The Punisher, a story soon to be retold in a film version, fits a similar 
mold in which the superhero does justice thoroughly unconstrained by the state or 
by compassion for evildoers.52 
 A second strand is represented by the Lone Ranger, a former Texas Ranger 
who takes on a mask to avenge the killers of his fellow Rangers.53  Yet, “[h]is 
violence is qualified by elaborate restraints: he never kills or even seriously hurts 
anybody, even though he often shoots them; and though he has left official law 
enforcement himself, he always hands the subdued evildoers over to the 
authorities.”54  The Lone Ranger’s modern incarnation is Superman, a less 
vengeful, more powerful immigrant to the American community (albeit from 
planet Krypton), who nevertheless uses extra-legal violence to cleanse his adopted 
home, whose own justice institutions are not up to the job.  Yet, “Superman is 
conservative about challenging the community’s failing institutions.  Like the Lone 
Ranger, he always delivers the evildoers to the police rather than killing them or 
dishing out his own punishment.”55 
                                                                                                                            
49  JEWETT & LAWRENCE, CAPTAIN AMERICA, supra note 48, at 28. 
50  Id. at 29. 
51  See generally FRANK MILLER, BATMAN: THE DARK KNIGHT RETURNS (1996). 
52  See generally GARTH ENNIS & STEVE DILLON, THE PUNISHER (2002). 
53  See JEWETT & LAWRENCE, CAPTAIN AMERICA, supra note 48, at 31. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
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 If these two strands of the American monomyth represent an inherent cultural 
struggle, a tension between The Punisher and The Lone Ranger in our national 
conscience, then Daredevil stands out because he embodies that tension 
symbolically in a single man and ultimately resolves it.  He starts the movie as The 
Dark Knight, ending it as Superman, the embodiment of “truth, justice, and the 
American way.”56  Daredevil, and movies like it, should thus appeal at least 
subconsciously to a struggle waging in most Americans’ psyches.  I do not claim 
that such an appeal will “win” the death penalty debate for the abolitionists.  But 
the sense of discomfort, of cognitive dissonance,57 that movies like Daredevil can 
                                                                                                                            
56  I used to hear that phrase at the end of the voiceover introduction to each episode of the 
Superman television series.  It seemed, then, to me to embody a call to strength with compassion, 
punishment with restraint, principle over power (though my young mind might not have quite 
articulated it that way).  The phrase still evokes those sensibilities for me, though I admit to a bit of 
hypocrisy in my own internal struggle between Superman’s call for measured justice and the green-
skinned, hyper-strong Hulk’s bestial cry, “Hulk Smash!”  See generally STAN LEE, THE ESSENTIAL 
HULK VOLUME 2 (2003); Skippy Piner, Hulk Smash!, at http://www.comicseek.com. 
57  “Cognitive dissonance” refers to the discomfort that most people feel when they 
simultaneously hold two irreconcilable ideas.  See LAUREN SLATER, OPENING SKINNER’S BOX: GREAT 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 113, 116–17 (2004).  Dissonance occurs 
when you recognize at some level that your behavior contradicts your core beliefs or when you are 
confronted with factual evidence inconsistent with such beliefs.  See id. at 114–21.  The resulting 
discomfort must be resolved.  Some people do so by changing their professed beliefs or by revising 
their original beliefs to fairly account for the new factual evidence.  See id.  But many, perhaps most, 
people “will engage in the most amazing mental gymnastics, all to justify their hypocrisy.”  Id. at 119 
(emphasis in original). 
Rephrased, many people will revise their core beliefs to justify (rather than change) their 
seemingly contradictory behavior.  Likewise, they will find rationalizations to avoid giving up their 
core beliefs rather than accepting the implications of contrary proof.  For example, a cult predicting a 
catastrophic flood that never happens rationalizes that their “little group sitting all night long had 
spread so much light that god saved the world from destruction.”  Id. at 116.  American POWs in the 
Korean War who accepted small bits of rice from their captors for writing anti-American essays 
similarly came sincerely to believe Communist dogma.  Behavior inconsistent with patriotic bravery 
led the soldiers subconsciously to reason thus: “If you sell yourself for a piece of candy, or a single 
cigarette, or a scatter of rice, you had better come up with some convincing reason why you did this, 
lest you feel you are, just simply, a schmuck.”  Id. at 118.  Accordingly, the soldiers convinced 
themselves that they wrote the traitorous essays not in exchange for pitiful bribes but because they 
believed that the Communists were right. 
It is not known why some people react to dissonance with serious introspection while others just 
rationalize.  Yet even if only a small percentage of death penalty supporters so introspect, that is a 
step in the right direction toward building a critical mass of new abolitionists.  Furthermore, logic 
suggests that repeatedly inflicting dissonance, that is, creating new dissonance from many sources to 
counter each new rationalization, will make rationalization more difficult.  In Daredevil, the 
dissonance arises from the audience’s cheering on Daredevil as a hero precisely because he wreaks 
righteous vengeance on evil; yet he withholds the ultimate vengeance (death) from the corrupt mass 
of flesh who is most deserving of it: the Kingpin.  And he does so expressly because he declares that 
“good guys,” heroes, just do not kill.  The movie offers its own explanation of the dissonance: 
Daredevil’s original belief that evil persons must die was morally wrong.  Even more, it was 
motivated by a rage and cold-heartedness inconsistent with American notions of fairness.  The film 
thus counsels real introspection, confronting the audience with the hypocrisy of any other choice. 
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evoke, may over time “help to shape the public sense of what is appropriate”58 in 
the realm of the death penalty, softening up the public, perhaps making it more 
willing to consider change, and recasting the understanding of the death sentence 
as an act of state violence rather than popular sovereignty.  It is this last point in 
particular that may raise receptiveness at the conscious level to growing evidence 
that the death penalty too often represents an abuse of state power, ensnaring the 
innocent with the guilty, the good with the bad. 
 There is thus cause for optimism, because repeated public revelations fill the 
media about those on death row who were wrongly convicted of crimes they did 
not commit.  A Broadway play, The Exonerated, tells their story, as does a best-
selling Scott Turow novel, Reversible Errors.59  A handful of empirical studies 
indicate that evidence of innocent persons being condemned undermines support 
for the death penalty, and does so more than any other abolitionist argument.60  
Challenges to the wisdom of retribution as justifying death or to the claim that the 
death penalty serves as a deterrent do little to change minds.  But proof of 
innocence does a lot.61  
 Support for the death penalty is to some degree rooted in emotions resistant to 
logical change.  That is where art, both high-brow and low-brow, enters.  Films 
like Daredevil and novels like Reversible Errors can do much to unsettle frozen 
emotions.62  Tales of real-life suffering of the innocent-but-condemned can help 
                                                                                                                            
Moreover, empirical data suggest that people are able to overcome their own subconscious biases 
if they are both made aware of them and of the psychological reasons why they are reluctant to let 
them go.  See generally JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE 
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997).  By making viewers aware that their own needs 
for security, vengeance, and control may have much to do with their support of the death penalty, the 
rationalizers might be open to change.  This last observation is all the more true because due process 
fairness notions are at the heart of the American sense of honor.  See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 264–98 (2003).  There is no reason why that sense of honor—which is a 
powerful motivator in the American psyche, see id. at 264–98—should not prevail when its 
inconsistency with the death rage often motivating support for capital punishment becomes apparent. 
Under the right circumstances, cognitive dissonance can be a great thing, motivating reasoned re-
evaluation of previously entrenched decisions rather than continued self-delusion. 
58  JEWETT & LAWRENCE, CAPTAIN AMERICA, supra note 48, at 28. 
59  See SCOTT TUROW, REVERSIBLE ERRORS (2002). 
60  See generally Laurie Anne Whitt, Alan Clarke & Eric Lambert, Innocence Matters: How 
Innocence Recasts the Death Penalty Debate, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 670 (2002) (summarizing the data).  
For a summary of the evidence on the causes of wrongful convictions, especially in death cases, see 
BEYOND REPAIR?: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003) (discussing wrongful 
convictions and the death penalty); WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (discussing wrongful convictions more 
generally). 
61  See Whitt, Clarke & Lambert, supra note 60, at 691–95. 
62  In general, media portrayals of crime and justice “appear to have most influence on people’s 
factual perceptions such as the amount of crime they believe to be occurring and have less direct 
influence on overall evaluations of social conditions or ideas about what should be done.”  SURETTE, 
supra note 46, at 226.  However, the danger of convicting the innocent is a “factual perception,” and 
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too, making those on death row seem more like the rest of us.63  When 
supplemented with data showing that state murder of the innocent may be anything 
but rare, it becomes harder to see the death penalty as the work of an unerring, 
trustworthy, and righteous community.  It is revealed for what it is: the ultimate act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
recent research shows that it is one that helps to undercut support for the death penalty.  See Whitt, 
Clarke & Lambert, supra note 60, at 691–95.  Accordingly, appeals to innocence might do more to 
affect public attitudes toward criminal justice policy than is generally the case concerning media 
impacts on justice system behavior.  Media can also have indirect impact on criminal justice policy 
by affecting more general mores; for example, images of proper gender roles can alter the probable 
outcomes at date rape trials.  See generally Taslitz, supra note 48.  Daredevil, and films like it, work 
so very well, I argue, precisely because of their subtle and subconscious emotional appeal, raising 
perhaps vague and ill-formed doubts about the fairness of the death penalty.  When novels like Scott 
Turow’s Reversible Errors overtly challenge the fairness of the death penalty, albeit from a different 
angle than Daredevil (for in Daredevil the criminals are in fact guilty), the audience should be more 
receptive to these challenges, more willing to take the “little step” of favoring abolition because of 
the risk of killing the innocent.  But once that line is crossed—once abolition is consciously embraced 
on any ground—films like Daredevil may continue to do their work, perhaps even more effectively, 
setting the stage for a conscious willingness to reject death, even for the guilty. 
63  See Mark E. Olive, Foreword to MICHAEL MELLO, DEATHWORK: DEFENDING THE 
CONDEMNED, at x (2002): 
The death row lives described in Deathwork reveal that, again, these 
individuals are exactly like you.  They are not defined by—they are not just— 
the worst things that they have ever done.  Are you?  Mike shows the love and 
compassion these individuals have for one another and for their families, 
humanity blooming on death row the same way it blooms in your home.  He 
shows how the clients genuinely fret over the lawyers’ well-being, for goodness 
sake.  And he shows the indominatability of human spirit—poetry, humor, 
spirituality, and grace—in the face of sometimes virtually certain death. 
Olive’s statement may be overdone, for part of the problem in creating empathy for those sentenced 
to death row is that they are so often not like us in many ways, if “us” means the jurors and judges 
who decide their fate.  Death row inmates are often poor, racial or ethnic minorities, with criminal 
records.  Olive’s statement whould better be seen as capturing the strategic need to make the public 
see that there are nevertheless similarities, ones that may in some ways be more important than the 
differences.  
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of state violence, a power whose arbitrary exercise must be feared and whose 
presence can corrupt republican citizens’ virtue and taint their very souls.64 
    
 
 
 
 
    
                                                                                                                            
64  See STEELWATER, supra note 4 (noting that history reveals that both the legal and extra-legal 
forms of the death penalty generally empower one social group at the expense of another, usually 
weaker, group).  Austin Sarat optimistically argues for a “new abolitionism” condemning the death 
penalty not for what it does to the defendants but for what it does to American culture: 
[S]tate killing contributes to some of the most dangerous features of 
contemporary America.  Among them are the substitution of a politics of 
revenge and resentment for sustained attention to the social problems 
responsible for so much violence today; the use of crime to pit various social 
groups against one another and to generate political capital; what has been 
called an effort to “govern through crime”; the racializing of danger and, in so 
doing, the perpetuation of racial fear and antagonism; the erosion of basic legal 
protections and legal values in favor of short-term political expediency; the 
turning of state killing into an invisible, bureaucratic act, which can divorce 
citizens from the responsibility for the killing that the state does in their name. 
AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION 30 
(2001).  Added to Sarat’s list might be the amplification of our historical willingness to treat criminal 
defendants as a type, rather than unique individuals, and our obsession with defendant-degradation as 
essential to punishment, despite our rhetorical commitment to the very opposite values.  See 
WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 3–67.  I worry that Sarat’s accurate observations will nevertheless lack 
public appeal for those unconverted to abolitionism, or at least to the many fervent defenders of the 
death penalty, while the innocence argument seems more likely in the short-run to support moratoria 
that may lead to effective abolition in practice.  See Whitt, Clarke & Lambert, supra note 60, at 725–
35 (making this argument). 
